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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
MTOE: Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent
1 TOE = 107 Kilocalories = 41.868 gigajoules
= 11.63 Mwh = 397 thcrms
LPG: Licluid petrolcum gas ("bottle gas")
Energy
intensiveness: energy required per unit of output
Elasticity:    responsivcncss to a change, e.g., the price elas-
CPI:
CSO:
EDM:
Relative
price or re~d
price:
In :
ticity of demand is the percentage change in
demand restdting from a one per cent change
in price.
Consumer Price Index
Central Statistics Office
Energy Demand Model
the price relative to the Consumer Price Index
for All Items.
Natural logarithm or log to the base e
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This paper has two ,aims. First, it presents projections of
encrgy dcnland to 1990 which emerge from an an,’dysis of
data on past energy consumption. These projections must bc
viewed ,as just one contribution to a set of forecasts which
should bc made nsing a variety of approaches. Secondly, it
discusses the role of encrgy pricing as part of an encrg3’
policy.
In the first chapter some background information is pre-
sented on total consumption and final deliveries of fuels
from 1950 to the present clay.
Time second chapter presents an analysis of the data. This
produces a wide range of projections of energ5, demand
depending on assunaptions made concerning time time paths
of GDP and cnerg3, price and on time ways in which energy
consumption responds to these, l!’nerg5, price emerges as a
small but significant factor influencing demand in time short
run. However, in thc longer term this influence increases.
The third chapter contrasts these projections with the
official projections made by the l)epartmcnt of Industry,
Commerce and Energy (1978), the latter being somewhat
higher and shortly to be revised, and looks at them both
within the context of experience in othcr conntries.
Chapter four discusses some of the issues raised in the
foregoing chapters. In particular it discusses aspects of
energ3, pricing as part of an energy policy. It concludes that
current lack of recognition of the importance of pricing
causes price structures to exist which help to undo some of
the effort put into energy saving programmes in recent years.
Chapter 1
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Ireland’s Energy Consumption since 1950
Since 1950, energy consumption has more than doubled.
This applies both to total energy and to energy deliveries, as
can be seen from the graph in Figure 1. By the term "de-
liveries" is meant all fuels which go to the final consumer for
use in heating and lighting and so on, excluding deliveries of
fuels for conversion to some secondary fuel. The trend dis-
plays three main phases: instability from 1950 to 1958, a
rise from 1958 to 1973, and unsteady growth after 1973. It
will be usefnl to look at each of these phases in turn with the
help of two measures of the relative price of energy (that is,
the price of energy adjusted for general inflation) and of the
time path of GDP since 1950, given in the lower part of
Figure 1.
In the first phase of final deliveries up to 1958, energy
consumption fluctuates around the two and a half MTOE
level. Within this period, 1950/51 was a very cold winter,
1955 witnessed a relatively high GDP growth and 1956/57
saw the Suez crisis and consequent rise in fuel prices. The
GDP stagnation of 1956 to 1958 contributed to tbe low total
deliveries in the final years of this phase.
The second phase from 1958 to 1973 shows a steady
growth at an average compound rate of 5.8 per cent per
year, such that by 1973 final deliveries approached two and a
half times thc 1958 level.
This leaves the third phase, from 1973 to the present,
featuring the dramatic price rises of 1973/74 and 1979, and
the recession of 1975/76.
The three phases of energy consumption more or less echo
that of GDP, as is to be expected, and in the middle phase
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deliveries grow faster than GDP overall. The phases are also
f~drly consistent with tile trend in prices, which similarly dis-
plays three phases in reverse image: a high phase, followed
by a decline, followed by a high phase again. In other words,
one can discern from the graphs a consistent relationshiI>
between final deliveries of fuels, oil the one hand, and GDP
and fuel price on the other. GDP and price are likely to be
importazlt factors influencing fuel demand, though not the
only factors, ,as we shall discuss later. Now we will turn our
attention to the i)aths of the individual fuels which make up
energT deliveries.
Final Deliveries of Individual Fuels
Information on individual fuels is summarised in Figure 2
whicb shows the paths of fuel deliveries and of individual
fuel prices over the period since 1950. Tile data have some
shortcomings and have yet to be formally analysed. However,
they were considered to be worth presenting here in diagra-
matic form.
The fuel showing outstanding growth is obviously oil. The
rise of oil consumption is accompanied by considerable de-
clines in coal and to a lesser extent turf, which two initially
constituted three-quarters of final deliveries. The oil price
rise relative to consumer prices in general, following the Suez
crisis, and the coal and turf relative price declines of the next
few years saw a halt in the growth of oil consumption and a
temporary reversal of the decline in consumption of coal and
turf. In turn, coal and turf appear to compete with each
other.
The rise in the usage of oil seems hardly surprising when
one looks at price movements; between 1959 and 1973 the
price of oil relative to consumer prices declined by over 30
per cent in contrast to the relative prices of coal and turf
which rose by six percent and declined by 14 per cent respec-
tively. The price of oil relative to the price of other fuels
combined fell by some 25 per cent. A more important reason
may be that the use of solid fuels, requiring a person to stoke
and remove ash~ was most hit by lal)our costs, since hourly
earnings rose by 84 per cent relative to consumer prices dur-
ing this phase (in fact data till 1963 cover weekly earnings
MTO£
3
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Indices of fuel price~: as in column (9) of Appendi~ 1.
The price index for e~ch fuel ~ ©x pr elacd r©[alive to the CP~ ~nd not dlrF’ctly re,alive
~o etch olhcr. Read¢~ inlcre~ed in ~he price of ¯ fuel re[~live to olhct fuels might
cor~ult Appcr~Jix 8 for ¯ lable *J’~ow[r~ costs per unlt of u~eful he.at. Fl~ure~ for
1979 and ~ome for ]978 are provisional.
6
only). Tbis would bave imposed an increasing addition to the
cost of using solid fuel. Since 1973, on the other hand, the
price of turf bas risen less than that of other fuels (except
LPG or bottle gas, not shown) and turf’s share has risen
accordingly.
E[ectricity’s share since 1950 bas grown from about tbree
per cent of finai deliveries to over 11 per cent by 1977. It
too supplanted the labour intensive fuels for the reasons
outlined above, especially as its relative price decline during
the 1960s was even more spectacular than that of oil. This
relative price decline of about 36 per cent reflects technologi-
cal improvements in the efficiency of electricity generation as
well as declines in feedstock prices. Furthermore, since 1973
the price of electricity has risen relatively less than that of
other fuels (except turf and LPG) because fuel costs are less
than 50 per cent of total costs and prices are consequently
cushioned against any extreme fuel price movements. Also
with 25 per cent of electricity being generated from turf,
electricity users have recently benefited from the fact that
turf prices are pegged artificially low, a point discussed in the
final chapter.
Final deliveries of towngas have been fairly constant over-
all. Meanwhile LPG, starting from a small base, has doubled
its deliveries since 1970. Towngas and LPG, combined, now
account for about four per cent of final deliveries and are
equivalent to some 35 per cent of final deliveries of electricity.
To summarise then, since 1950 we have seen a decline in
the share of labour intensive fuels, turf and coal, and a rise
in the share of non-labour intensive fuels, oil, electricity and
the combined gases. Reversals of the trends occurred recently
in the cases of oil, turf and coal, probably for reasons of price,
be it the price of the fuels themselves or indirectly, in the
cases of labour intensive fuels, the deceleration in the rise of
the price of labour relative to energy price. Apart from some
obvious uses, such as lighting, the fuel deliveries diagram
would suggest that a reasonable degree of substitution between
fuels c,qaa and does take place.
Having discussed the background information in broad
terms, we will now analyse the data to see what relationships
emerge and what projections they give.
lJ
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Chapter 2
A NA L ):SIS OF ENERGY DEMAND AND PROJECTIONS
TO 1990
In this chapter we start with a brief outline of the analysis
of the data covering the pcriod 1958 to 1977. We then pre-
sent projections of energy demand in 1990 based on certain
assumptions. Details of the analysis are given in Appendix 2.
Basically our task is to construct a model which gives a
relationship between energy consumption and the items
which affect energy consumption. We know that in theory,
price will affect the qnantity of a good consumed. It is clear
that income, or GDP, also exerts a strong innuence on energy
consumption. It is also realistic to assume that responses to
changes in encrg5, price take a while to materialise. Using
statistical criteria, the results lend some support to this
simplified assumption about behaviour.
The results of the analysis provide us with estimates of the
responsiveness of energy consumption to price. We find that,
in the short run, a one per ccnt rise in the relative price of
energy results in a 0.3 per cent decline in energy consumption
approximately. In the long run, however, when all the
responses are played out, there is a 0.7 per cent or 0.8 per
cent reduction in energy consumption, in all. After about
one and a half years, roughly 50 per cent of the response
has taken effect.
We will now examine the projections of energy consump-
tion to 1990, which emerge from the foregoing analysis.
Projections from the Mode&
Projections to 1990 are made for four situations of GDP
and energ3, price. These situations are summarised in the
following table undcr the headings Case 1 to Case IV.
Table 1: Four alternative assumptions for GDP and energy price in 1990
Case Case Case Case
1 H Ill 1 V
1977-90 Growth in GDP (%) 70 70 70 100
Implied annum GDP growth, (%) 4.17 4.17 4.17 5.48
1977-90 Growth in price of energy
relative to consumer prices, (%) O 20 50 20
Implied annum relative price rise (%)    0 1.41 3.17 1.41
The average rate of growth in GDP having averaged about
four per cent for the last decade or so, a fairly likely situa-
tion might lie around Case II. It shotdd be noted that the
price rises refer to the Fuel and Light price index deflated
by the All items index, and that over 1973/74 this relative
price rise amounted to 31 per cent. It should also be noted
that GDP itself is not unaffected by changes in energy price
but this is not allowed for here. A population forecast of
3.63 million is used for 1990, based on Keating (1977). The
recent population revision may cause us to raise this forecast.
Energy consumption in 1977 was 7.5 g~I’OE. The follow-
ing table gives a summary of the projections. Full results are
shown in Appendix 5.
Table 2: Projections of total primary energy demand in 1990, MTOE
Case Case Case Case
Fun c tional form 1 H lll 1 V
(a) All variables* in log form 15.44 13.93 12.28 17.65
(b) Energy and GDP in log form 15.52 13.71 11.45 17.39
(c) GDP in log form 12.43 11.57 10.34 13.21
*Energy, GDP and price.
In addition to showing projections for the four cases or
combinations of GDP and energy price, Table 2 gives the re-
suits from three functional forms. The use of any functional
form involves making implicit assumptions about the
10
bebaviour of future responsiveness of encrgy consumption to
changes in GDP and price. In Table 2, in line (a), thc func-
tional form chosen implies no change in responsiveness from
that gener,’dly prevailing in the period 1958-1977. This would
seem unlikely. The functional form in (b) implies an increas-
ing responsiveness of energy consumption to price changes.
The functional form chosen in (c) implies a declining respon-
siveness of energy consumption to GDP growth. The func-
tional forms in (b) and (c) seem reasonable.
The divergence between the figures is quite large. It is a
salutory rcminder of how one’s implied assumptions can
innuence the results.
Summary of Analysis
These models are an attempt to extract as much informa-
tion as possible out of existing time-series data, such ,as it is.
We find that while energy consumption is strongly influenced
by GDP it is also affected by price, especially when one allows
for a time lag in the response. The evidence suggests that in
the long-run, a 10 per cent rise results in a 7 per cent decline
in energy consumption compared with what it would have
been. Studies based on earlier years did not always find this
(e.g., Booth (1966, Part Ill)). So we cannot exclude the possi-
bility that responsiveness to price might increase. This might
in particular be tbe case if the full response to the 1973/74
price hike, in terms of energy saving technology currently
being developed, does not materialise for a while.
The projections to 1990 show a wide range, from about 18
MTOE down to 10 MTOE, depending on the assumption one
makes. The high projections ~sume, however, an average
annual GDP growth of 5Y2 per cent over 13 years, 1977 to
1990, which would be an historic achievement. The more
likely assumption for GDP is contained in the first three
cases. A plausible rangc for encrg3, consumption would be
from 11 to about 14 MTOE. Some of the uncertainty sur-
rotmding the projections may resolve itself after a few more
years of data clarify the trends of energy responsiveness to
GDP and price.
II
Chapter 3
A COMPARISON HqTH RECENT PROJECTIONS AND
FOREIGN EXPERIENCE
In the last chapter we gave the projections of energy dc-
mand in 1990 which emerged from our time-series analysis.
In this chapter we assess these projections in a broader con-
text. How do they compare with the recent official projec-
tions published by the Department of Transport and Power
in 1977 and the Department of Industry, Commerce and
Energy in 1978 and what does a comparison with inter-
national data reveal?
A Comparison with Official Forecasts
A summary of tile official forecasts is given in Table 3
below. Both sets cur official projections are showa~ since the
underlying relationship between energy and GNP appears to
be the same, judging from Figure 3 below. The projections
made in 1977 are denoted by 1, and those made in 1978 by
2. The most recent official "best estimate" for energy con-
sumption in 1990 is 18 MTOE~ compared with 7.51 for
1977, a rise of 140 per cent. This is associated with an official
GNP rise of 99.5 per cent, that is a compound anmial rise of
52,6 per cent, ,as shown in the fourth column of Table 3 below.
As future energy price levels ,are not given in the official
text, there is no exact match between the official projections
and ours. Broadly speaking, the official "best estimate" of
18 MTOE would correspond to our Case IV which incorpor-
ates a "moderate" price rise of 20 per cent. Our Case IV
ranges from about 17V2 dowal to 13 MTOE, placing the
1. This figure is reduced to 16.5 M’rOE in Energ)’ Ireland (Department of Indus-
try Commerce and Energy, 1978a) when conservation is taken into account.
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Table 3: Official forecasts of energy consumption in 1990
with associated GNP assumptions
Low Medium High
] 2 1 2 1 2
1977-1990 growth
in GNP (%) 47 71    121    1O0 180 148
Implied Annual
GNP growth (%) 3.00 4.23    6.30    5.46    8.25 7.23
Energy consumption
1990 (MTOE) 12.4 15.0 21.4 18.0 29.3 24.0
official "beast estimate"
Note: GNP figures are approximate due to rounding.
official forecast at the top end of our range for this GNP
assumption. Similarly, the official projection of 15 MTOE
associated with a 71 per cent GNP growth corresponds to our
other cases which range from 15V2 MTOE down to about 10V2
MTOE. Clearly, the official relationship used for any given
GNP figure is producing energy levels at the top of our range.
The relationship apart, the underlying assumption in the
official "best estimate" is that GNP ~¢ill grow on average at
just under 5V2 per cent over the period 1977-1990. To be
realistic, this should be re-labelled a "High" assumption. In
fact, these official projections are undergoing revision.
The Projections Viewed in the Context of International
Experience
We will now view these projections against information
from other countries. Foreign experience provides a useful
check so long as one takes care to recognise the different
influences on energy use resulting from different conditions
between countries.
Figure 3 overleaf plots the total energy consumption per
head against GNP per head for 22 OECD countries in 1976.
There is considerable variation about the trend line for whicb
one would seek explanations in the differences in energy
pricing policies, in the composition and scale of output, in
the type of technology, in population density, in climate,
14
and so on. Superimposed on this graph are the official pro-
jections for 1990 and the results of our time-series analysis.
The official projections are well above the plots for other
countries. Our time-series projections are, if anything, also on
the high side of the international trend.
Before we investigate whether the international trend itself
is moving upwards or downwards, we should try to tackle an
important problem which arises in international comparisons
of this sort. The problen~ centres on the GDP (or GNP) per
capita expressed in a common currency such ,as the United
States dollar. We use GNP per capita because wc want a
measure of wealth or purchasing power, but exchange rate
conversions to a common currency do not yield a reliable
comparison of purchasing power. In particular, Kravis et al
!1978a), describe how tile reld per capita GDP of low
income countries relative to that of high income countries
is greater than is indicated by comparisons bascd on ex-
change rate conversions of GDPs to a common currency.
Kravis has adjusted the figures of nominal GDP per head
for 16 countries to givc real GDP per head. Ireland is not
among the sixteen. However, Kravis has estimated real
GDP per head for Ireland, among other countries, by extra-
polating the relationship between real GDP per head in the
sixteen and certain independent variables including measures
of exposure to world markets and of price isolation. Kravis
notes that the estimated figures of re.’d GDP per capita are
subject to largc margins of error, but arc almost surely sub-
stantially closer to the true figures than the "nominal"
measures commonly used.
It is interesting to redraw Figure 3 plotting energ3, con-
sumption per head against Kravis’ figures of real GDP per
head. This is given2 in Figure 4 which shows a noticeably
stronger relationship between energy consumption and real
GDP per laead than given in Figure 3. The correlation co-
efficient has improved from .79 in the previous graph to .90
2. Kravis’ most recent figures are for 1974. These were roughly updated to 1976
using 1974-76 growth rates from OECD Economic Outlook Nos. 21 and 23,July
1977 and 1978, and 1974-76 population changes from UN Demographic Year-
book 1976, Table 5.
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implying that real GDP gives a better explanation of energy
consumption than nominal GDP. It is also interesting to see
how the ranking of energy intensiveness of GDP (as measured
by the slope of the line joining the origin to cach country’s
plot) has changed. Instead of being fourth in energy-intensive-
ness, that is only less energ3, intensive than Canada, US and
UK as seen from the previous graph, Ireland now moves to
the middle, to the level of Germany. This is a considerable
improvement, though to be on a level with Germany in
energy intensity seems high still. However, there are aspects
of each country which might influence energy intensiveness
in different ways. On the one hand, Germany has a higher
proportion of heav3’ industry and a colder climate, on the
other hand, its population density is between five and six
times that of Ireland, its climate is less damp and it has more
opportunities to benefit from economies of scale. It is also
possiblc that Germany, like some other advanced economies,
has a higher proportion of service-type industries and indus-
tries with a high skilled labour content. However, regardless
of which GDP measure is used, it is evident that Ireland ranks
among the energy-intensive nations of the world.
When the projections arc superimposed on this graph a
different picture emerges. The time-series projections are
more central for each given GDP level. The official projec-
tions, though more reasonable now that they are plotted
against real GDP arc still not far from the upper edge of the
plots. For GDP per headlying between 60 and 70 (US = 100),
Ireland is superseded by Netherlands, Finland and Belgium,
which three countries respectively have a high proportion of
indigenous energy, a harsh climate and a high level of steel
production relative to most of the countries. For GDP per
head lying between 70 and 80, (US = 100), Ireland is only
superseded by Norway, where practically all electricity is
generated by hydro.
Our discussion must now turn to ask whether the entire
international scatter of plots shows signs of shifting upwards
or downwards over time. To be specific, we want to know
what, if any, have been the changes in energy intensiveness
of GDP in these countries. If a country is moving such that
the slope of the line from the origin to the new position is
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less than to the old position, then tbe energy intensiveness of
GDP is declining. Table 4 below shows the growth rates of
GDP and energy consumption for the period 1963-73,
during which energy prices declined, and for tbe period
1970-76 which saw a price rise. The last two columns give the
ratios of the growth rate of energy to the growth rate of GDP
for each country. A ratio of less than 1 indicates that the
energ3, intensiveness of GDP was declining and a ratio greater
than 1 indicates that the energy intensiveness of GDP was
rising. A negative means an absolute dccline in energy con-
sumption over the period.
The last two coltmms suggest two features. The more
advanced countries tend to have lower ratios, tmless they
have large indigenous supplies of energy, such as the Nether-
lands or Canada. This suggests that the more advanced corm-
tries have a different composition of output and/or they are
Table 4: Average annual growth rates of GDP and energy consumption
Average annual growth rates Ratio of
1963--73
Energy
GDP Cons.
(1) (2)
growth rates of
1970-76 energy to GDP
Energy 1963- 1970-
GDP Cons. 1973 1976
O) O) O) (6)
Eur 9 4.5 4.50 2.97 1.98 1.0 .66
Eur 6 5.0 5.39 1.07
Germany 4.6 4.31 2.52 1.65 0.94 .65
France 5.5 5.37 4.10 2.86 0.98 .70
Italy 4.7 7.29 2,97 2.56 1.55 .86
Netherlands 5.5 8.11 9.62 4.80 1.47 1.33
Belgium 4.9 4.28 3.94 1.25 0.87 .32
Luxembou~g 4.0 3.21 1,V5 --0.02 0.80
--.01
UK 2.9 2.09 2.00 --0.005 0.72
--.003
Ireland 4.4 5.62 3.10 3.43a 1.28 1.11a
Denmark 4.8 5.08 2.49
--0.005 1.06 --.0002
USA 4.2 4.48 2.87 1.76 1.07 .61
Canada 5.5 6.32 4.99 4.04 1.15 .81
Sources: Col. 1 Basic Statistics of the Community 1973--74, Table 13:
Annual Rates of Growth of GDP (at constant market prices).
Col. 2 & 4 OECD Energy Balances 1974/76, p. 26.
Col. 3 Basic Statistics of the Community 1978, Table 16.
a Figures based on Energy-Ireland, 1978, p. 17.
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able to replace existing capital equipment with more efficient
equipment, so their energy intensity falls, or rises less rapidly.
The present high ratio for Ireland may reflect its developing
status (see page 49). Secondly, the period of the large price
rise 1970-1976 has consistently lower ratios than the first
period, supporting the view that energy intensity is respon-
sive to price. So the indications are that energy intensiveness
abroad is unlikely to rise and may well fall, at least if there is
a period of sustained energy price rises. Indeed this has been
made a target of policy. For instance the European Council
(Bremen, July 1978) adopted the objective of a ratio of 0.8,
for what it is worth. Should this occur, in terms of our graphs,
tile top ends of the projections will be higher still relative to
the other countries, leading one to question whether the ful-
filment of these projections is likely.
Other Forecasting Approaches Required
So far in this paper discussion has centred on national
totals of energy consumption and their forecasting. Fortun-
ately there are several approaches to forecasting. In particu-
lar it may be more worthwhile to build up forecasts for the
individual consuming sectors. Tbcrc is a breakdown by. con-
suming sector in the official projections, but it is not clear
how these were derived. In particular the official forecast of
1990 energy consumption by industr3, implies a 40 pcr cent
growth in the energy intensiveness of industrial output.
Obviously, while Ireland’s industrial sector is grooving the
actual quantity of energy is likely to rise, but only if more
energy intensive processes or products arc being introduced
will energy per unit of output rise. Our information on this is
poor. Information on past trends currently available for four
European countries, namely, the UK, France, Germany and
Holland are given in Table 15 below. This gives the trend of
energy intensit3 by sector over the period 1960-1974 during
most of which tk re energy prices were in fact falling.
The preponderance of declining intensities suggests that
once a sector has "industrialised" its subsequent capital re-
placement is more energy efficient. What are the trends in
the configuration of labour, capital and energy in Irish pro-
duction likely to be? Are machines being introduced for the
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first time, or are there already machines being used which
will in time be replaced by more energy efficient machines?
These questions need to be investigated for each sector.
Table 5: The trend of energ’y intensity over the period 1960-1974
in four European countries, by sector
Sector UK France Germany Holland
Iron and steel ....
Aluminium -- -- - + +
Other non-ferrous metals -- -- --
Glass -- -- --
Cement -- -- -- +
Other building materials
-- + --
Chemicals -- + -- +
Paper and pulp ....
Other industries ....
Land transport 0 -- -- 0
Sea and air transport 0 + -- + +
Other services 0 + + +
Private transport -- + --
Other household uses 0 + -- +
Sources: Report on EDM in the EEC energy modelling programme. UK
information is derived from the coefficient in double log equations.
-- = declining energy intensity 0 --constant energy intensity
+ =rising energy intensity + -- -- decline followed by rise and
w. for-- +
We notice from Table 5 that Holland is an exception with
a predominance of rising intensities. This may be related to
the abundance of natural gas which became available and
which may have affected the~composition of output within
the classifications used here. The composition of output is
another factor of major importance when considering future
energy demand and we need to have some idea of the types
of new firms which are likely to establish here. Whatever
they are, we ought to be able to assume that they will adopt
the new more energy efficient machines and processes now
becoming available.
An industry by industry consultation and analysis is
needed if only to ascertain the direction of energy intensity.
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Between 1962 mid 1973 we have some evidence that it was
growing in most industries. But we also know that Ireland
now ranks quite high in energy intensivcncss of GDP by
world standards. Until we have more knowledge of what is
happening in industry, we are hampered in our efforts to
estimate future energy consumption.
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Chapter 4
SUMMA R Y AND IMPLICA 770NS FOR POLIC ~..3
The results of our ,analysis can be summarised as follows:
1. Energy demand in 1990 will be considerably higher than
today’s level of around 8 MTOE, but it may be lower than
the official forecasts published in 1978. Given that we are
uncertain ahout the course of the main factors which deter-
mine energy demand, namely GDP, the real price of energy
and technology trends, the rm~ge of likely outcomes, from
11 to 14 or 15 MTOE, is quite large.
2. While demand for energy is not very responsive to price in
tlre short term, in tbe long term demand seems to be much
more responsive to price. Using past evidence as a basis, a
10 per cent rise in the real price of energy (that is the Fuel
and Light price index deflated by the All Items price index)
brings about a decline of approximately 7 per cent in
energy consumed after a time lag of several ),ears.
It remains now to ,assess the implications of these results
for energ, y policy. Before this can be done, however, we
need to clarify the reasons for having an energy policy and
to examine tire role of government, its aims and the means
for implementing energy policy. This done, we will consider
the record so far, particularly in the light of our second result
above, which relates to price. We conclude with a set of prin-
ciples which could provide the framework for a coherent
energy policy.
Why do we Need an Energy Policy ?
Since we are content to leave the levels and pattern of
consumption of many commodities to be allocated by the
market, it is worthwbiIe asking why we need a national
energy policy at all. Why is energy so special?
3. Much of the material in this Chapter was drawn from McCarthy (1979).
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The usual answer to this question is that energy is so
essential and so pervasive. It is used for heating, transport,
motive power, and lighting, and it is used by all sectors of the
economy. Our lifestyle in the recent past has become adapted
to relatively cheap energy such that minor disruptions in
supply cause serious economic and social disturbances. How-
ever, this factor on its own would mainly call for an energy
stock-piling policy to enable us to ride out temporary disrup-
tions. Longer disruptions might be mitigated by having
diversity of fuels and suppliers as well as by having unused
indigenous resources.
The second factor which makes energy different is its very
large import content. Three-quarters of our consumption is
imported oil. The bill for these oil imports amounted to
.£330m in 1978, or 9 per cent of total imports and 6.3 per
cent of national income. However, this is not a strong reason
for singling out energy for special treatment while not doing
so with the other 91 per cent of imports.
A third factor is our membership of the EEC and the IEA.
These bodies have energy policies, both laying strong emphasis
on conservation. There is an obligation on us to abide by the
rules of these organisations. However, since most member
states of these organisations consume more, and some a good
deal more, energy per head than the average Irishman, they
only have a strong position in argtfing that Ireland should
consume less energy per unit of GDP. As we saw Ireland
appears high on this score though this may partly be an illu-
sion due to measurement conventions. Nevertheless, Ireland
might face sanctions, if energy effectiveness fell to any large
extent.
A fourth factor is that fossil fuels, which constitute 97 per
cent of our present energy consumption, are a depleting
resource. Therefore, it is argued, all nations should combine
to consume less energy than they would do, at the going
price, to make it last longer. This is often viewed as a moral
argument; indeed one can derive moral satisfaction from
energy conservation per se. Appropriate resource conserva-
tion can be described as an investment for the future in the
usual sense that present consumption is given up for the sake
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of future benefits. However, except in the case of our own
native resources where this might apply, restraining constnnp-
tion of forei~l resources is hardly going to cause more re-
sources to be left over for Ireland at tile end unless all energy
importing countries restrain constnnption together. We
account for a mere 0.14 per cent of global energy use. indeed
even if most importing countries manage to combine to
restrain consumption, but one large bloc fails to do so, the
restdt is likely to I)e that the "selfish" bloc will reap the bene-
fits of the lower price (relative to what it wonld have been)
and raise its constlmption into the bargain. The argument so
far for restraint on the part of a small cotlntry is not strong,
though the argument for urging joint action on the part of all
energy importers is stronger. We will need to look further for
the raison d’etre for an energy policy in Ireland.
We said that fossil fuels are a depleting resource. This
means that as depletion occnrs their prices will rise up to
those of the renewable energy resources, biomass, wind etc.
We do not know what this new pricc ~fill be. In the US,
Manne (1979) has given the present price of these so-called
backstop technologies at I)etween two and three times the
current OPEC price. In the case of Ireland at present some
may be lowera and some higher. It is uncertain when this
new price will prevail since new reserves may be found in the
meantime, the rate of depletion will vary and new coal tech-
nologies are likely to intervene. The eventual price of renew-
able resources is also uncertain since technological improve-
ments may reduce the currently expected future price. There
is also uncertainty about how smooth this transitional price
rise will be. One study, by Gately and Kyle (1977) looks at
various price paths as seen from OPEC’s point of view. Their
conclusions are that OPEC’s interests may be well served by a
strategy that is "relatively cautious about further major,
abrupt price increases. Such a strategy, closely rcscmbling the
position reportedly advocated by Saudi Arabia, wotdd
4. If there exist unemployed factors of production, then appraisals of these new
technologies, using conventional accounting criteria, are likely to overstate the
costs in national terms. For example, the cost in national terms of employing
labour that would other~cile be unemployed is lower than the market wage.
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increase price only gradually when market conditions warrant
and would cut price aggressively if necessary to defend
OPEC’s market position."
However, they add "more aggressive pricing strategies may
also yield as good or better results for OPEC. Hence, con-
suming countries should not ignore the possibility of further
abrupt price increases, perhaps a doubling or tripling of price
within the next ten years." The sudden demand for renew-
able energy resources resulting from such abrupt price in-
creases would meet bottle-necks and cause time price to over.
shoot the longer ternm price temporarily.
In sum, then, we can say that the price of energy will
eventually be the price of renewable resources hut we do not
know what the transition path of price will be. Present indica-
tions are, however, that the price of renewable resources is
higher than current fossil fuel prices, so the present view
must be that we have to adapt to higher energy prices, in any
c~tse. The main thrust of energy policy must be to enal31e this
to happen in a sensible manner.
The Role of Government
We must ask to what extent time government, as opposed
to market forces, has a role to play in energy matters. Views
differ on this issue. On the one hasad, there is the view that
governrnents show no evidence of being far-sighted or of
understanding individual circumstances, and that anyway,
due to electoral pressures, they are "four-year optimisers".
On the other hand, there is the view that individuals are
myopic, they cannot take long-term decisions and cannot be
as well informed as governments. Doubtless this debate will
continue but there are some further aspects to take into con-
sideration where energy is concerned.
The government is already involved directly or indirectly
with matters affecting energy. It is engaged in taxing energy,
in controlling energy prices and in controlling semi-state
bodies which use or produce energy and require funding or
approval from the government. Therefore it is inevitable that
the government be involved in energy policy to a large extent.
There are a number of restrictions, lieences, laws and so on,
which affect energy demand or the response of demand to
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price. Obviously these have to be tackled at government level
where many originated in the first place. In addition, given
the high levels of uncertainty about the future, only with
government support will some of the more costly long-term
research projects into renewable resources be undertaken.
The risks of delayed returns are large, and governments are
better able to take these risks than private concerns. Further-
more, referring back to the analysis of previous chapters, we
saw that consumers respond to price but after a lag. In other
words the price mechanism, while operating, does so in a
sluggish manner at present. Govennnent can provide encour-
agement to speed up responses.
The Aim of Energy Policy -- A dap ta tion
It cannot he denied then that the government has ma im-
portant role to play. It is also clear that the ultimate aims of
its energ3’ policy must be to proceed with a wide ranging
process of adaptation to consunaing lower levels of fossil
fuels as their world priccs rise. This should be accompanied
by a progressive introduction of renewable resources. In-
cluded with these are thc fossil fuels with long-term promise,
e.g., coal. It is adaptation rather than mere conservation that
is needed. Adaptation includes conservation and should entail
long-term substainable effects rather than just temporary
sacrifices of comfort. In other words, graduM structural
changes are requircd. These chaslgcs will be more difficult to
bring about than the painless adaptation to falling real energy
prices of thc previous decadc.
In the next section we look at the possiblc strategies which
may bc used in pursuit of such a policy.
Possible Strategies: Rationin¢, Exhortation, Directives and
Pricing
The -.alternative methods of altering the pattern of de-
mand for any group of goods are (a) rationing, (b) exhorta-
tion, (c) directives and (d) pricing including (i) taxation and
(ii) decontrol. We will illustrate each of these options with
the aid of a demand function which describes the quantity of
a good demanded at various prices. Our examples show how
constnnption can be reduced, though they could equally be
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used to illustrate how consumption can be raised. (For ease
of exposition ave assume infinitely elastic supply).
(a) Rationing. By this ave mean formal rationing. Initially
ave have price P0 with corresponding quantity demanded Q0.
Price
PI
P0
Qi Qo Quantity
The officially desired vohlme of consunrption is Qi. Ration-
ing can achieve this and the incipient rise in price to Pt is pre-
ventcd. Unsatisfied demand at this price is Q0 - Qi and a
"black" market might or might not emerge depending on the
effectiveness of policing. Thc fact that rationing does not re-
move the excess demand is one disadvantage. Its rigidity is
another, in that interpersonal differences can only be catered
for to a limited extent. Nevertheless, rationing is often advo-
cated on the grounds that it is "fair" or l".ss arbitrary than
rationing by queueing, such as we have had for short periods
in recent years.
A well knownvariant ofrationingsuggested by Walsh (1979)
applicable to petrol rationing, for example, would entail
isstling all persons tile same conpons, regardless of whether
they were pedestrians or what sort of car they clrove. These
could be used for buying petrol at price P0 or they could be
sold at whatever is the going market price for coupons
(Pi - Po in this case.) This system ensures that everyone czm
get a minimum quantity of fuel at the low price P0. Beyond
this quantity they have to buy coupons from someone who
does not want his, paying in all the market price Pt. This
system removes excess demand and redistributes income to
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those who use least petrol or none. The average price paid is
less than Pt, but greater than the artificial low P0 imposed
under a conventional rationing system.
Rationing has an important role when there are disruptions
which are temporary, though not too temporary in view of
the administrative costs involved. Rationing may be prefer-
able in a crisis to a market clearing price because people ~411
not have had time to adjust. For the longer term, the case for
or against rationing should rest on whether it is the best
method for bringing about the widespread adaptation of
which wc have spoken.
(b) Under exhortation, the authorities use advertising or
similar means in an attempt to shift the demand curve
inwards from Do to DI. The market now clears at the old
price with no excess demand and no need for quantitative
interventions.
The political expediency of this method may account for
the noticeable increase in official publicity campaigns in one
sphere or another. Given that energy conserx, ation is a long-
term problem, it must be asked whether campaigns of exhort-
ation would have to bc permanent in order to be effective.
The public might lapse from whatever level of virtue they had
attained as soon as the campaign ceased. These campaigns can
be costly. Even with permanency their cost effectiveness is
questionable. Also, problems arise which are similar to those
encountered in the international context when some mem-
bers do not restrain consumption.
However, exhortation can play a useful role if it is com-
bined with a supply of information. The public will not con-
serve energy, even though it would pay them, if they do not
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know how to go about it. Details of good housekeeping prac-
tices, good driving practices and so on are all useful. More
information on potenti,’d money savings from conservation,
more technic,’d assistance and more constlmers’ association-
type analyses of methods and brands would also be desirable.
These might help cut down tile long time spent by consumers
searching out information, which, if they have not lost inter-
est, at least delays their actions.
(c) Directives. Similar to exhortation is the method of
directives, such as the setting of insulation standards in build-
ings. These also attempt to shift the energy demand eu~,e
leftwards. Directives have varied possibilities and are worth
looking at for cases where the consumers of energy are not
directly responsible for paying the bill, for example, for the
temperature level in offices. They are also essential when the
consumer cannot be expected to have the expertise to judge
for himself the energy implications of an investment like an
appliance, or a house. With imported appliances, only those
meeting certain standards of efficiency might be allowed into
the country. In theory directives should force people to do
what they would do anyway if they had correct information,
were responsible for paying for the energy, and acted ration-
ally.
(d) Pricing: (i) Taxation
If demand at the old price Po is considered to be too high,
the authorities can impose a tax. If Ds is the (short ron)
demand curve, a tax of Ps-Po per unit will clear the market at
the desired quantity Q~. Excess demand does not appear. If
the long-run demand curve, DL, is more elastic, a lower tax
PL-Po will suffice.
Ps "’-"- -
PL ",".
Po t
I Us "DL
q,    qo
The objections to regulating demand by price, rather than
by rationing, rest on a concern that low income people will
be hard hit, that industrial production costs will be raised and
that tile rise in the CPI will generate inflationary wage de-
mands. This argtmlent usually rests on the assumption that
the alternatives to using price as a regulator are costless which
is clearly not the case. It also rests on the assumption that
when a tax is imposed the extra government revenue some-
how disappears, or is spent in the wrong area. However, if a
tax were imposed on energy, there is nothing to stop the pro-
ceeds of the tax being used to reduce the tax on other con-
sumer items ,,vl’~ich feature in the CPI. Similarly, in the case
of the manufacturer, the proceeds from a tax on energy can
be used to reduce tax or raise subsidies on some other factor
of production, such as labour. Government policies of the
past two decades have lowered the cost of capital relative to
the cost of labour. (Geary, and MacDonnell, 1979). ’Fhis
encouragement to capital intensive production may incident-
ally have been a stimulus to energy intensive production,s
Some attempts to mitigate this could now be made by using
extra energ3, revenues to reduce the costs to the manufacturer
of employing labour. At least such intervention will be working
more in the desired direction, where labour, capital and energy
are concerned, than at present; so regulating energy demand
by price does not simply mean raising tax, it could mean
switching taxes. "l’his is in marked contrast to a price rise
imposed by OPEC, for which obviously we cannot compen-
sate ourselves.
Of course all the arguments in favour of using price to con-
trol demand rest on the assumption that demand is not totally
inelastic with respect to price. That is to say, if price is raised
quantity dcmandcd will fall. This assumption is justified by
the results of our analysis. It is true that short-run response
is small particularly for fuels which have no near substitutes,
such as for petrol when public transport is inadequate.
Response will be small when technology changes are expen-
sive, such as the introduction of some conservation measures.
5. See Appendix 7 for elasticities of substitution for energy and capit’,d calcula-
ted for the US.
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Response might ,also be small when the consumer lacks the
expertise to judge the energy implication of his actions, as
mentioned above, or when he does not have to pay for them
directly anyway. As already stated, directives and informa-
tion might be appropriate here. In general, in cases where
response to price changes is small it is worth first investigat-
ing why this is the case. It may be easier to remove the cause
and then use pricing, than to resort solely to one of the other
strategies. Examples might be the introduction of individual
meters for each flat in apartment blocks or the introduction
of bicycle paths. In any case there is no evidence that de-
mand for energy is totally unresponsive to price, especially
in the long run, which concerns us here.
Pricing: (ii) decontrol
It is widely observed at present, that price control of
energy operates to keep prices down. There is no evidence to
suggest that energy supply is unresponsive to price changes,
other than in the short term. Therefore, in addition to in-
fluencing demand, a rise in the price of fossil fuels will in-
crease profitability of other sources of energy at the margin,
that is of indigenous fossil fuels and renewable resonrces. In
the case of the national research effort investigating new fuel
technologies and renewable resources, a rise in the price of
fossil fuels will increase the expected return from any given
expenditure. At present, a major obstacle in the way of wide-
spread experimentation and demonstration is thc low mone-
tary value of the fossil fucls saved and the expectation that
the real price of energy may not be a/lowed to rise.
Opposition to decontrolling thc price of indigenous fossil
fuels often stems from a view that the suppliers will make
large profits. This might not be undesirablc since large funds
are required for research into and developments of long-term
energy supplies.
Apart from its effects on supply, the pricing of indigenous
resources to file consumer at levels below the world energy
price will lead to a misallocation of those resources. Excep-
tions might be made in the short term to build up a market,
provided this can be made up in the long term. Underpricing
amounts to a subsidy, a subsidy encourages additional con-
snmption, which is the oppositc of what is required.
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So much for the theory. We have a classic example of what
happens in practice when price is ignored. Project Independ-
ence in the US attempted to deal with the threat of future oil
embargoes by cuttinl{ back imports but with price controls
maintaining ~ua artificially low price. The result, according to
Jorgensen (1978) was "that demand was allowed to rise more
rapidly than it would have risen . . . domestic supply to fall
more rapidly than it would have fallen. The impact of Project
Independence was a dramatic increase in petroleum imports".
If Ireland is really interested in tackling the task of adapta-
tion and conservation, we must learn from experiences of this
type and realise that pricing will have an important role to
play along with some of the other strategies.
We will now turn to evaluate the record on energy po)icy
so far.
771e Record
(a) Formal rationing has not been implemented in recent
years, probably rightly given the circumstances.
(b) Exhortatio~ is widely appliecl. Much of it contains useful
information6 to enable the consumer to use energy
wisely. People will tend to follow the advice up to the
point where the percei~,ed net gain falls to zero. Unless
the perceptions are changed, further expenditure on ex-
hortation is a waste of public funds. There is clearly a
growing interest in energy conservation. [t is difficult to
know how much is attributable to the exhortation and
how much to a gradual common sense reaction to the
1973/74 and 1979 price hikes.
(c) Some directives have been issued for example in the form
of requirements of thermal instdation levels in public
sector house construction. This was extended belatedly
to private sector housing in 1978/79 as qualification for a
Certificate of Reasonal)le Value. Some would view the
standards for walls as inadequate, and the application
affects new houses only. Even, here, application is not
universal. Clearly a high level of commitment is required
for the application and monitoring of directives. In adcll-
tion, a coherent programme for adaptation will require a
programme of directives introdt+ced over a span of ),ears.
6. See, for example, IIRS publications.
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Some existing directives in other spheres are cotlnter-
conservationist, such as prohibition on own account road
hauliers from carrying back loads after making their own
deliveries. Some means of bcstowlng the benefits of such
rules might be sought, which are less wasteful of cnerg3,.
(d) Tile record oil pricing is poor. The criticism is not simply
that price has been ignorect through not switching taxes
from other items to energy. The criticism is also that pric-
ing has been nsed in the opposite direction to that which
is required. It has acted as an encouragement to increased
consumption, as we now show.
For a given group of commodities, their relative prices will
affect the relative quantities bought. Compared with a uni-
form tax, a lower tax rate on one particular commodity en-
courages its consumption rather than merely fails to dis-
courage it. We might ask, then, what is the rate of tax on
energy compared with that on other goods. We find that
the average rate of indirect taxation less subsidies on personal
expenditure on all goods and services is 15 per cent (NIE
1977). However, apart from the transport fnels, energy has
practically no tax imposed on it. Coal, turf, electricity and
towngas are chargeable at the zero rate of VAT. Non-transport
oils pay excise duty at a rate of about 4 per cent. In other
words, three-quarters of all energy in Ireland is sold ,almost
tax free. This favoured tax position for energy, relative to so
many other products and services consumed, is not generMly
recognised.
The transport fuels, petrol and diesel and a small amount
of LPG, which account for about 23 per cent of all primary
energy consumption, face excise tax and VAT and yield a
sizeable revenue. It is quite reasonable to regard the taxes on
these oil products, combined with the annual licence fees, as
payment for road track costs, although these costs are not
related in any simple way to an individual vehicle’s fuel con-
sumption. The National Prices Commission (1973) attempted
to show the extent to which various categories of road user
paid their way in 1970/71. While all categories were found to
be contributing more than the costs they imposed, the esti-
mates took no account of external costs such as congestion,
accidents, loss of amenity and pollution. Since then the
annual licence fees have been greatly redtlced in real terms, or
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abolished. Also, sincc then, the total taxes imposed per gallon
of road fuel have declined in real terms. Indeed the tax per
gallon of road diesel has more than halved in real terms.
Therefore it has to lye shown whether road users, especially
users of road diesel, ~u’e now covering the costs they impose.
If they are effectively being subsidised, this would have long-
run effccts via the location of factories, warehouses and so on.
When a subsidy is considered essential for the viability of
an enterprise which is worthy of being maintained, the sub-
sidy should not be granted through tax reduction on their
energy inputs. This is currently the case with towngas enter-
prises and passenger road transport. These subsidies could be
given directly so as not to cheapen energy inputs.
The time-path of energy price is a separate isstle. We saw in
the first chapter that between 1974 and 1978 there was a fall
in the Fuel and Light price index relative to consumer prices
in general. This was possibly undesirable in the context of the
long term. Inertia on the consumer’s part tends to be re-
warded, until the next big rise, which is more disruptive than
it need be. Theoretically it is possible for governments to
have an energy price stabilisation policy. While it might be
difficult to determine what the "correct" price rise shonld
be, it should be possible to prevent real price from falling.
This might complement macro-economic stahilisation policy.
In practice there could bc difficultics but it is worth investi-
gation.
Thc rccord on pricing of indigcnous cnergy resources is
questionable. It would appear that neither turf nor natur,’d
gas is priccd close to thc world price of the fucl for which it
can substitute. In the case of turf this would be roughly the
price of cozd, on a thcrm for thcrm basis. For natured gas this
might be roughly thc price of gas oil. The reasoning is that a
therm of natural gas can save us from importing a therm of
gas oil, which in turn saves us from having to export goods to
that v,’due in order to pay for the gas oil. This is the v~due to
the nation of the natural gas as was explicitly recognised by
the Minister in his statement on the Kinsale Head gas (repro-
duced as Appendix 9).
Natural gas should in general be allocated . .. on the basis
of market prices .... The pricing arrangements with the
ESB in relation to its allocation of natural gas should be
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reviewed as soon as possible with a view to determining
what would be an appropriate energy related price.
Charging less than a price related to the world price of the
fuel it can substitute for amounts to a subsidy. If it is con-
sidered necessary to subsidise the purchasers of natural gas,
the subsidy is better given explicitly rather than through
cheapening the gas as this reduces the incentive to use this
input efficiently relative to otber inputs. If processors of
natural gas and turf receive it at, in our sense, a subsidised
price, which is then passed on to the consumer, we have the
anomaly that consumers of large amounts of such products
receive more subsidies than consumers of small amounts.
High income households spendiug more, in absolute terms,
on such products would therefore receive most subsidy.
Granted that poor houselaolds may spend a higher propor-
tion of their disposable income in this way, than do richer
households, the subsidy might help the poor proportionately
more. However, it is widely recognised (Fletcher 1972, Webb
1978) that tackling poverty through the manipulation of
energy prices is a blunt instrument which leaves the underly-
ing causes of poverty untouched. In the current circumstances
it is also highly undesirable. It would encourage a higher con-
sumption of energ3, than would otherwise have occurred and
give misleading signals to the planners determining future
processing capacity.
On a more positive note, there has been official action to
reduce the price of conservation measures to energy users,
through grants of various kinds. These include gra2ats for fuel
efficiency in industry, grauts towards approved expenditure
on equipment which will reduce energy usage, grants towards
R & D projects which have a significant technical input aimed
at conserving energ3,
, 
and subsidies for boiler efficiency tests.
Home improvements grant are available for conservation
measui’es undertaking in houses.* It is difficult to estimate
from published sources the total amount of money made
available. Of course more money could be available for con-
* Since this report was written, the home improvements grant scheme has been
discontinued.
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servatlon, and appllcd for, if an extra tax wcrc imposed oil
energy.
Many low incomc households would be unable to avail of
the grants. Some programme like the "Weatherlsation" pro-
gramme in the USA where an employment scheme is nsed for
house-insulation in low income households, might be appro-
priate.
We have not in fact evaluated the relative costs and benefits
of the existing conse~,ation measures. While they seem to be
aimed in the right direction, energy conservation measures
should properly be evaluated in the context of the t~k of
transition ahead and using accepted project appraisal methods
(Ruane 1979). These take account not only of the energy
saving, but the costs of achieving the energy saving, in terms
of other resources, properly valued.
This is a mixed record so far. Government support for con-
ser’,,ation through exhortation and grants has to sonic extent
been cancelled out by the remainder of its pricing policy
which has reduced energy conser’vation. Energy pricing has
not even been neutral. The past five years have seen a succes-
sion of t~Lx reductions o11 energy and energ3, using appliances,
combined with price controls and subsidies. The minimum,
neutral, role for government is to remove those aspects of
pricing which are cotlntcr-conscrvation. Then, if it is con-
sidered that the government should play a positive role in
the long term widespread adaptation to more expensive
cnergy in the future, an active pricing policy will be needed,
along with some of the other strategies.
Principles
In the light of the foregoing analysis the following wollld
sccm to be sensible principles to apply. They are by no means
exhaustive.
(a) Removc the virtual exemption of most energy from tax
by imposing VAT on all fuels.
(b) Mitigate the regressive distribntional effects by using
some of the proceeds for a programme to compensate
low income households.
(c) Use tile remainder of the proceeds to reduce taxes or
raisc subsidies on other itcms. The cmphasis might be on
subsidising goods, activities and investmcnts, at domestic
and industrial level which promote tile desired long-term.
adaptation.
(d) Indigenous fuels should be priced near the world price of
thcir cquivalcnt fuel, on an equiwdent energy basis. This
includes any potcntial discovcrics of hydrocarbons. From
the energy user’s point of view, the energy intensive
alternative must not artificlaIly be made to be the cheap
alternative.
(c) For thc same reason as given in the last sentence, where
subsidies arc considercd desirable, the subsidy should be
explicit or granted on non-energ3, items and not granted
through price or tax reductions on energy.
(f) Introduce firmcr directives progrcssively and with due
warning for building insulation standards and for energy
use in buildiogs. Other rules and practices, remnants of
the cheap energy era, which work in the opposite dircc-
tion to energy conservation should be removed. Current
protcctions offcrcd by such practices, if desirable, could
be granted by some other route.
(g) Continue the information campaign with less emphasis on
exhortation, more on helping the consumer and con-
SUl]]er associations to nlakc their own calculations. Con-
sumcrs’ own analyses carry more validity for them and
they will be better cquipped to re-evaluate proposals
when prices alter.
(h) lnvestigatc the feasibility of an energy price stabilisation
policy which aims at removing misleadiog temporary
declines in real price.
This list only covers the more immediate points raiscd by
the results of the previous a~al’ysis. A strong emphasis on
price has been made in this chapter. The reasons for this are
threefold:
(i)our previous analysis showed that price does have an
effect on demand,
(ii)because this is not sufficieotly recognised at~d because
decisions have becn taken ~’ithout adequate concern for
38
energy pricing, recent pricing policy has, if anything,
operated in tile wrong direction and
(ill)the current view of the rencwablc energy sources is that
they cost more. Our long-term task of widcsprcad adapta-
tion to these new sources can hardly be achieved without
a coherent pricing policy.
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Appendix 1
Data used in the time-series studies
(t)            (2)
Total energy Final deliveries
cott~mption
’000 TOE ’000 TOE
O)
GDP (by sector
of origTll at
factor cost)
1970£m
1950 2961 2602 n.a.
1951 3210 2959 ,,
1952 3003 2685 ,,
1953 3040 2700 ,,
1954 3050 2643 ,,
1955 3348 2986 ,,
1956 3176 2816
1957 2873 2458
1958 2899 2420 ’877.9"
1959 3391 2719 926.6
1960 3540 2949 972.5
1961 3535 2937 1012.5
1962 3678 3010 1049.4
1963 3891 3195 1083.0
1964 4132 3301 1138.9
1965 4314 3450 1152.7
1966 4568 3767 1169.7
1967 4934 3984 1229.2
1968 5050 4086 1311.5
1969 5340 4567 1366.7
1970 5750 4842 1399.7
1971 6780 5447 1481.5
1972 6820 5508 1546.0
1973 7083 5636 1648.1
1974 7209 5581 1683.4
1975 6787 5180 1692.0
1976 7039 5357 1746.0
1977 7512 5737 1842.0
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Appendix 1 contd: Data used in the time.series studies
O)
Population
(5) (6) (7)
Total energy Fbtal deliveries GDP per
consumption per head head
per head
"FOE TOE 1970 £
ET ED GDP
1950 2969 0.997 0.876 n.a.
1951 2961 1.084 0.999 n.a.
1952 2953 1.017 0.909 n.a.
1953 2949 1.031 0.916 n.a.
1954 1941 1.037 0.899 n.a.
1955 2921 1.146 1.022 n.a.
1956 2898 1.096 0.972 n.a.
1957 2885 0.996 0.852 n.a.
1958 2853 1.016 0.848 307.7
1959 2846 1.191 0.955 325.6
1960 2832 1.250 1.041 343,4
1961 2818 1.254 1.042 359.3
1962 2824 1.302 1.066 371.6
1963 2841 1.370 1.125 381.2
1964 2849 1.450 1.159 399.8
1965 2873 1.502 1,201 401,2
1966 2884 1.584 1.306 405.6
1967 2899 1.702 1.374 424.0
1968 2910 1.735 1.404 450.7
1969 2921 1.828 1.564 467.9
1970 2944 1.953 1.645 475.4
1971 2978 2.277 1.829 497,5
1972 3014 2.263 1.828 512.9
1973 3051 2.322 1.847 540.2
1974 3086 2.336 1.809 545.5
1975 3127 2.170 1.657 541.1
1976 3162 2.226 1.694 552.2
1977 3192 2.353 1.797 577.1
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Appendix 1 contd.: Data used in the time-series studies
(8) (9)
Real price of fuel and A general energy
light prlce in dex
August 1953 -- 100 1963 = 100
PFL PE
1950 104.6 106.4
1951 108.9 127.4
1952 101.7 116.8
1953 99.8 107.6
1954 99.8 107.4
1955 99.8 108.0
1956 111.6 118.5
1957 106.3 122.7
1958 99.6 113.9
1959 95.5 109.3
1960 93.5 102.4
1961 96.8 102.3
1962 97.1 102.6
1963 100.2 100
1964 94.5 96.7
1965 91.9 94.1
1966 91.8 91.9
1967 90.5 94.4
1968 90.5 93.7
1969 87.9 86.2
1970 87.9 81.0
1971 91.5 89.4
1972 92.8 87.6
1973 87.9 84.0
1974 115.2 122.3
1975 107.4 128.4
1976 106.7 130.4
1977 109.4 140.2
Sources: Column (1) 1968-1977: Energy Ireland; 1963--1968: OECD
data checked by CSO; 1950--1963: J.L. Booth lIl; The data for
overlapping years showed considerable discrepancies, such as that growth
rates from the earliest two sources had to bc used.
Column (2) 1973--1977: Energy in Ireland, Department of
Industry Commerce and Energy; 1963--1972 OECD; 1950--1962 J.L.
Booth II and IIL The same problems were encountered as for (1).
Column (3) GDP from National Income ~md Expenditure 1975
Tables A4 and B4, updated from QEC.
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The regressions used data from 1958--1977.
Source: Column (4) Reports on Vital Statistics
Columns (5), (6) and (7) are columns (I), (2) and (3) each
fivided by column (4).
Source: Column (8): Fuel and Ligllt Consumer Price Index (August
1953 = 100) divided by All Items Consumer Price Index (August 1953
= 100). Irish Statistical Ilulletins. This index unfortunately excludes
transport fuels and is based on purchases by households only.
Column (9): Purchaser prices of the five major fuels were
obtained (CPI data from CSO were used for coal, machine turf’s price
was used for turf, medium fuel oil’s price was used for oil except for
1973-1977 when a combination of gasoline, fuel oil and gas oil was
used, in tile Dublin Gas Company’s ordinary domestic tariff was used for
gas, and revenue from electxicity sales per unit sent out was used for
electricity.) These prices were each based on 1963 = 100, then deflated
by the All Items Consumer Price Index (1963 = 100), They were then
each weighted by dieir fuel’s share in total deliveries to give a single
index. While broader in its coverage than (4}, this index could and
should be considerably improved with more detailed components.
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Appendix 2
DET~I ILS OF" TI-IE TIME-SERIES AAt/I L ]tSIS OF ENERG It
DEMAND AND PROJECTIONS IN 1990 GI I~’I-N IN
CHAPTER 2
The time-series analysis covers the period 1958 to 1977. A
feature of the energy market in Ireland is that price changes
arc largely detcrmincd by changes in world cnergy prices and
taxation, that is, outside the normal internal market process.
Expressing quantity as a function of price would give us a
demand function. It is clear, however, that this demand
relationship is shifting owing to income changes so that the
addition of the income variable is required to correct for
these shifts. Our task is to fit an cqu,’ation which expresses
energy demand as a function of income and price. We will
briefly dcscribc thc data, the choice of functional form,
selected results of the time-series analysis, and the time-
scrics with a distributed lag in the price effcct. Finally, there
is a brief discussion of the projections.
The Data
Several problems arise in relation to the data. In the first
place there is the problem that total energy consumption,
though expressed in a common unit of energy cquivalcnce, is
neither homogeneous nor unchanging in its composition. For
example, the last two decades have seen a decline in energy
delivered to final buycrs as a proportion of total energ3, con-
sumed, in part due to the rising proportion of electricity. In
seeking to overcome this some researchers (e.g., Nordhaus
(1976)) use energy, delivery to final buyers (final deliveries),
onc of the measures used in Chapter 1 and a measure also
used here as a second option. This, however, does not over-
come the problems arising from the different efficiencies
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with which the various fuels are consumed in their final uses,
and the problems arising from the fact that the proportions
of each fuel, the efficiencies and the final uses of each are all
subject to change. Ideally we should construct a time-series
of final useful energy, but it is not clear that the calculation
of such a series would be worth tile effort involved, especially
when one considers tile shortcomings of the available data for
years up to the early 1970s. Selected results are given here
using the series on total recorded energy consumption. Full
results, including those based on final deliveries of energy,
are given in Appendices 3 and 4.
For the explanatory variables, income is given by GDP by
sector of origin at 1970 factor cost. Both energy consump-
tion and GDP are expressed per head of population. For the
other explanatory variable, price, there is the CPI for Fuel and
Light published by the CSO which on division by the All
Items price index, gives the relative or real price. This Fuel
and Light price index excludes fuel for transport and is based
on household consumption weighting patterns. An indepen-
dent, and more general, price index (graphed in Figure 1) was
constructed from purchase prices obtained from suppliers
of the major types of fuel, weighted by the fuel shares of
final deliveries, and expressed in real terms. Results, based on
this latter index, are given in the Appendices 3 and 4. While
this index covers a wider range of deliveries, it loses the detail
which CPI can pick up. Clearly, neither price index is ideal.
To summarise, then, we have either total energy or final
deliveries (in tonnes of oil equivalent per head) which we
wish to express as a function of GDP (in 1970 £000s per
head) and as a function of either the CPI for Fuel and Light
or of a general energy price index (1963 = 100). Full data are
given in Appendix 1.
The Choice of Functional Form
In choosing a particular form, one is to some extent pre-
determining the projected path. So, in addition to satisfying
the data in terms of fit, the form must give plausible pro-
jections. A run down of the implied elasticities of some
standard froms, given in Table A1 should help to guide one’s
choice.
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Table A 1 : Some standard functional forms and their elasticities
1\tame Form Elasticity Path of elasticity Elasticity limits
as × increases from x = 0 to
(y non-negatiue) x = o~ (note’)
1. Linear y = a + bx bx rising 0, +1
-7
2 Linear (negative) y = a -- bx -b_ x falling 0,
Y
3 Semi-log y = a + b ~nx b falling 0% 0
4 Semi-log y=a--b~nx --b falling 0,-°°
(negative) ~"
5 Semi-log ~n y = a + bx bx rising 0, oo
(depend. variable)
6 Semi-log ~n y = a --bx --bx fMling 0, --~
(negative)
(depend. variable)
7 Double log ~n y = a + b ~nx b constant
8 Double log ~n y = a -- b ~nx -b constant
(negative)
9 Log reciprocal " ~ny = a -- I~ b f’,dling 0% 0
x x
Note* or from minimum x to maximum x for y non*negative, where relevant,
and ~suming a is positive.
As we have two independent variables, GDP and price, we
have two elasticities to consider. Where GDP is concerned,
cross country studies (Darmstadter 1971) and some time-
series studies suggest an elasticity greater than unity for less
developed cotmtries declining to less than unity for devel-
oped countries, or to unity after correcting for efficiency in
use (Brookes 1972). This implies that as a country develops
the energy used in incremental output exceeds the average
for all output, and energy intcnsiveness is growing. But, for
a given level of technology and output composition, when
the manufacture of all products has adopted the latest tecb-
niqucs, energy intensiveness stops growing. For our purposes
we can reasonably assume that the elasticity, having been
quite high, should bc falling, or anyway in the long term, not
rising. This assumption limits our interest to functional forms
numbers 3 and 7, that is the semi-log or double log forms,
even though the bcst, in terms of fit, is number 5 which
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implies a forever rising energy GDP elasticity. This would be
quite unrealistic for anythlng but the short term, since it
implies tbat ener~,’s share will grow until it has absorbed
the wbole of GDP.
The price elasticity of demand for energy bas received less
attention except in the case of individual fuels. It may be safe
to assume, however, that as the price of energy rises, the
price elasticity will at least not decline in absolute terms. This
suggests that the relationships between energy demand and
price might be of the forms 2, 4, 6 or 8, namely, linear, both
semi-log relations or double log. It should be noted, however,
tbat those price elasticities with y in the denominator, forms
2 and 4-, actually do decline in absolute terms in our applica-
tions. This occurs because y, or energy, is a function of two
variables and GDP the dominant variable is mal~ing y rise.
Some Results of Time-Series Analysis without a lagged Price
Effect
Selected results are given here using the official data series,
that is total energy consumed, ET m~d the real price of fuel,
PFL, that is the CPI for Fuel and Light deflated by the All
Items Index. Full results are given in Appendix 3. The two
equations, which satisfy the theoretical requirements and
whicil are moderately satisfactory on statistical grounds, are
as follows (t values in parentheses):
lnET=3.05+I.411nGDP-O.3OblPFL    AdjR2 =0.98
(5.06) (26.88) (2.29) DW = 1.52
GDP elasticity = 1.41
Price elasticity = -0.30
In ET = 1.99 + 1.41 hi GDP - 0.0030 PFL    Adj R2 = 0.98
(13.66) (26.66) (2.27) DW = 1.52
GDP elasticity = 1.4 I
Price elasticity = -0.33
We see from these equations that the GDP elasticity is
about 1.4 and the price elasticity about --0.3. In general,
lower GDP elasticities and higher, more significant, price
elasticities emerged when the energy deliveries series was
used instead of the total energy series, used in the above.
5O
The general energy price index, having more variation, gave
a lower price elasticity, and was statistically more sigmificant
than the fuel and light price index. Using GDP at market
prices gave a worse fit and lower elasticities than GDP at
factor cost.
Turning from differences arising from the data to the ques-
tion of equation specification, the plausible assumption, that
the GDP elasticity falls in the long term, is not verified by the
relatively short-term data at our disposal, as equations with
just log of GDP, or log of GDP and price, showed bad Durbin-
Watson measures. The asymptotic formulations suffer on the
same grounds, though their asymptote levels are not out-
landish, being at about Swedcn’s energy constlmption per
head or at the official (1978) "high forecasts" for Ireland in
1990. As mentioned above, equations implying growing GDP
elasticity, with only energy in log foml were most satisfac-
tory. Ideally the search for an explanation of energy demand
should be much broader than that attempted here, perhaps
pursning the energy implications of the incentives to capital
intensive, hence possibly energy intensive production during
the period. Furthermore, with the GDP elasticity so large,
even the constant elasticity functions above will lead even-
tually to overprediction since an elasticity greater than unity
implies that the share of energy in GDP will grow without
limit as GDP rises. There is, however, one improvement
which could make the model based on our existing data more
realistic -- that is, the incorporation of lagged price effects.
Time-series Analysis with a Distributed Lag in the Price
Effect
It is realistic to assume that responses to energy price
changes take a while to materialist. Habits arc adjusted grad-
ually and decisions to buy new equipment and the scrapping
of old equipment will tend to take time. Eventually, tech-
nology itself will adjust. The full response to a price’change,
allowing for this time lag, should theoretically be larger than
indicated by the results above, where responses are assumed
to occur within the year. The following results bear this out.
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We specified agcometric or Koyck-typc lag on price so
that the model bccamc
Et=a+bGDPt + c ~ o~(1--a)kPt_k_l +ntk=o
where t = time period in years,
o<a<l
expected (tit) = 0
expected (tit ut+1) = some constant (02) when i=o
ex. pected     (ut ut+j)     = o when i~o and
k = a backward time index.
Since ct is less than unity, the term (l--a)k declines as k in-
creases, that is, the importance today, say, of any past [)rice
level declincs ,as its distance from the present incre;Lses. The
oo
term ~a(1--a)k is equal to unity so that thc coefficient
k O
c gives the long-run price response. In the short run, k=o, the
response is given by cC~ and applies to Pt_~. The mema lag is
given by (1--c~)/a and can he viewed as the length of time
elapsed for half the price response to take effect.7 Appendix
6 outlines the cstlmation method.
Selected results arc ;is follows, the full results being set out
in Appendix 4. Using again the official data series and thc
constant elasticity formulation, we have:
~n ET,t = 4.95+1.50 ~n GDPt(6.20)(21.00)
oo
--0.70 ~ 0.4(1--0.4)k~n PFL, t-k-I
(4.10) k=O
Adj R2 = .98
DW = 1.82
Mean lag = 1.50
GDP clasticity = 1.50
Price elasticity (short run) = --.028
Price elasticity (long run) = --0.70
7. Strictly speaking this is the definition of the median lag, given by: -- 0-n2/9.n(l-ct) (D. Gujarafi, 1978, p. 282) but the two are quite close in value here.
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and with just energy and GDP logged we have:
~n ET,t = 2.45 + 1.51 I~n GDPt -- 0.0071
(12.68) (20.84) (4.09)
oo
0.4 (1-0.4)k PFL, t--k--J
k=o
Adj R2 = .98 GDP elasticity = 1.51
DW = 1.83 Price elasticity (short run) = -0.31
Mean lag = 1.50 Price elasticity (long run) = --0.78
There is a considerable improvement in the Durbin-Watson
measure compared with the previous two equations with no
lags. As expected the short run elasticities fire more or less
the same as in the case with no ]figs, but the long run price
elasticity is more than double the short run price elasticity.
The model now suggests that a 10 per cent real rise in the
Fuel and Light price index will lead to a seven per cent decline
in total energy demand, in the Iong run, and that half this
effect will take place within 1.5 years.
The model shows an improvement after the inclusion of
lags in the response to price, and the resuhs al)pear reason-
able. There are, however, likely to be severld SCl)arate lags
when price changes. In the case of a price rise, the first source
of lag will be the delay before consumers get round to incor-
porating energy saving measures into their existing appliances
mid habits. The next wiII be the delay in purchasing more
efficient new appliances, until consumers feel they can scrap
their original appliances. A longer lag would be the time
elapsed between the occurrence of an energy price rise and
the appearance of new more energy efficient appliances on
the market. Our time-series covers only one major price rise,
that of 1973, and the data covers only four years after that,
though there was a major price-decline from 1958 to 1973
when opposite factors were at work. So if the model is pick-
ing up this longer lag, it is based on tbc periods of declining
prices, m~d the responses to rises and f~dls in price may, or
naay not, be symmetric~d. When price falls, one might not
scrap efficient machines and buy inefficient ones, though one
might buy a bigger, more energy intensive car.
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Discussion of the Projections
All the projections to 1990 are given in Appendix 5. In
particular the projections from the models with the distri-
buted lag in the price effect are presented at the end of Chap-
ter 2. In general the projections from the latter models are
between 0 and 2 MTOE lower than projections from the
models without the lagged effect, depending mainly on
assumptions about future price rises. Though in the expected
direction, this is quite a small change. The high and constant
GDP elasticity is still the major force at work. Introducing
the declining GDP elasticity assumption (in the form with
GDP and pricc logged and the form with just GDP logged)
gives markedly lower projections. Here, in Case IV, GDP
elasticity has declined from 1.21 to ahout 0.8 by 1990. As
mentioned (Chapter 3), the European Council adopted a
"ratio" of 0.8 as the Community’s objective for 1985 (Bre-
men, July 1978), the Community’s -ratio having been 1.0
and 0.66 for 1963-73 and 1970-76 respectivcly. In fact the
Department of Indust~,, Commerce and Energy incorporates
declining ratios in their official projections but these do not
go below unity. As for our model’s price elasticity, it is con-
stant in the "all logs" form and it declines (in absolute terms)
for most cases in the form with GDP and price logged and the
form with just GDP logged, energy bcing in the denominator
of the elasticity calculations. Only in the form with energy
and GDP logged do we find a marked rise in thc price elas-
ticity in absolute terms, from --.78 (long term) in 1977 to
--.93 for a 20 per cent price rise, to --1.17 for a 50 per cent
price rise (Casc III).
In summary then the projections show a wide range from
about 18 MTOE down to about 11 MTOE, depending on
assumptions. A 20 per cent real price rise and a 100 per cent
GDP rise over 1977 to 1990 and constant GDP elasticity give
an energy demand of about 18 MTOE. Replacing the above
GDP growth by 70 per cent reduces energy demand to about
15 MTOE. Then allowing for a lagged price effect brings the
projection down to 14 MTOE. Replacing the assumption of a
constant GDP elasticity by the assumption that it declines,
reduces the projection to about 12 MTOE. Higher prices
obviously reduce the projections again.
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Appendix 3
Results of tlme.series regressl~r~ of national energy consumption without
a lagged price effect (see notes at end) 1958-1977
Equations Elnsticities
Adj, R2 DW       GDP     Frice
All togs
~n ET= 3.08 + 1.41 £n GDP -- 0.30 ~n PFL .98
(5.06) (26.88)     (2.29)
enET=2.44+ ],40£nGDP--0.16~nPE ,98(8.46) (28.34)     (2.69)
~n ED 
= 
--3.05 + 1.33 ~n GDP - 0153 en PFL .97
(4.78) (23.89)      (3.90)
~n ED=-4.16+ 1.31 ~nGDP--0,29 £nPE .98(14.77) (27.38)     (4.96)
Energy and GDP logged
~n E,[,= 1.99 + 1.41 {~n GDP -- 0.0030 PFL.98
(13.66) (26.66) (2.27)
~nET= 1,85+1,41 ~nGDP-0.0016PE.98(23.73) (28.55) (2.74)
~n ED = 1,94 + 1.34 ~n GDP-- 0.0053 PFL.97(12.47) (23.59) (3.83)
~n ED = 1.69 + 1.32 £n GDP -- 0.0028 PE,98
(22.06) (27.33)     (4.94)
GDP and price loggcd
ET = 4.52 + 1.33 ~n GDP - 0.18 ~n PFL
(3.37) (19.93)     (0,64)
ET ffi 4.25 + 2.33 £n GDP -- 0.12 ~n PE(6.40) (20.63) (0.88)
ED = 5.55 + 1.77 £n GDP -- 0.58 en PFL
(4.95) (18.12)     (2.43)
ED = 4.40 + 1.75 ~n GDP-- 0,33 ~n PE
(8.38) (19.61)     (3.03)
Linear
ET = --0.19 + 5.48 GDP - 0.003 PFL .96
(0.81) (22.37) 0.92)
El- = --0.38 + 5.48 GDP -- 0,003 PE .97
(2.89) (24,49) (2.57)
ED = 0.36 + 4.17 GDP - 0,008 PFL .95(1.69) (19.41) (3.59)
El) = 0.02 + 4.14 GDP -- 0.004 PE .97
(0.24) (23.36)    (4.98)
1.52 1.41 --0,30
1,48 1.40 --0.16
1.70 1.33 --0.53
1.48 1.31 --0.29
1.52 1.41 -.33
1.46 1.41
-.22
1.69 1.34
-.38
1.42 1.32 -.39
.96" .88 .99 -.08
.96 .88 .99
-.05
.95 1.04
.98 -.32
,95 .89 .97 -,18
1.31 1.34
--,23
1.30 1.34 --.17
1,49 1.34
--.50
1.30 1.33 --.34
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GDP lo,ggcd
~l" = 3.86 + 2.33 ~n GI)P - 0.0018 PFL .96 .88 .99 -.08(] ].94) (t9.78) (-0.62)
ET ~ 3.80 + 2.33 ~n GDP - 0.0012 PE .96 .87 .99 --.07(21.06) (20.47) (0.89)
ED m 3.44 + 1.78 gn GI)P - 0.0068 PFI. .95 1.04
.99 -.33
(12.70) (17.90) (2.99)
E ) = 3.19 + 1.76 i~n GI)P - 0,0031 PI~ .95 .87 .98 --,24
22.24 9.49) (2.99)
EmrvO
.. 
logged
gn ET ~ - 0.,t7 + 3.30 GDP - 0,00,19 PFL .97 1.39 l.gl --.63(3.7 0 (23..~3) (3.50)
~n ET 
= 
--0.07 + 3.28 (.;DP -- 0.0026 PE .98 1.93 1.89 --.30
( t 0.3:,) (:~0.09) (4 .C,9 )
~nEI)--(I.38+3.I2GDP-O.0071 PFI
*
.96 2.05 1.80 -.78
(2.82) (22.39)    (.I.77)
~n ED = -0.68 + 3.09 GDP -- 0.0037 PE .98 1.98 1.78 -.52
(11.01) (29.62) (7.10)
.,l~ ymptotic talthout price
~n ET ~ 1.887 -- 0.382 I .97 .85 1.01 n.a.(32.37) (23.72) GDP
ASylllplole = 6.55 TOE pel head
’~n El) = 1.5737 - 0.54 1 .98 .61 .94 n.a.
(23.32)(18.91) GDP
t’~s.,,mplt~te . ,I.8 TOE per hc~ld
..l~ymptotic form~ with price
7c.+~](;Dl"
Form E = I e
~n ET = 2A094 - O.1123 ~n Pl"l. 0.5366I
.97 .93 1.02 --A 1
(3.40) (0.76) (23.04) Ca)l’
Asymph,te = 6.57 TOE/head (1977)
6.,14 "I’OE/head f~r 20% price rise
6.28 TOE/head f~Jr 50% price rise
~n El) ~ 3.2538 - 0.3611 ~n PFI. - 0.5536 [.96 1.08 .96 -,36
(4.60) (2.39) (21.25) (;I)P
A~ympzole=.L75 TOE/head (1977)
4.45 TOE/head for 20% price rise
4.10 TOE/head for 50% price rise
~n ET 
= 2.1768 -- 0.0623 ~n PE - 0.5842 1      .97      .92      1.01     -.o6
(6.30) (0.86)       (23.82) GDP
As~,,mpI~pte ~ 6.50 TOE/head (1977)
0.42 TOE/head for 20% price rise
6.33 TOE/h,:ad fiw 30% price rise
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¯ ~s!~ a3!Jd %Oq Joj i)l:.~q/:40,L fil "9
as!J a)!Jd %0~ .")J I)~:aq/~lOJ. ~.I"9
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") = :4 :ut~°A
(LL61) l)~q ’.40,I. 9~’t
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= ~lot(hn/,sv
d(I9 (Si;’~g) 3d (i-8’~) (£UH)
----(b 96"I0~1’~:’0 ~--9~OI’I~,+LL9g’(= :lU~
(LL61) l)Cml :’I O,I. 81"9 : .noldmlsV
,trlo(LC.’~) 3,1 (£80) (.,~6i)
L6"~0gSq’0 -’~-q0t,9"9 + 1~8"1 = "1"51 u~
(LL61) l"~aq HO.L I’L’I" = "~l~)ldtufi*sV
dqo(l’~’l~) "Md(~t.’Z,) (68’L) ----(’,
(L L 6 [ ) l)~:m[ HO.I. 9G’9" aloldtu.~sV
,~(t’.) (LI’¢~.) 7..1~ (~£’0) (Sg"H)
Lfi"~-191~’0 -- 7-- flS~EI 1 + qLLU[ = ’IQI u~
d & + dqDIg/ +~’) " 
:’/ :ut.toq
¯
-.~OZIm~4/~lOJ, ~ I,’t-
(LL~I) I)~41~’I O.I, 6q’l" ~ :’lol dlu/’sV
,{q .:3(0 t:’~.~ )(U.’~) (’; ’,;’L )
96"~09t"~’0 - 3d u~ 1’86[’0 - Ot’O~’F, = (l?I u~
,IrH)
t,).) I1Jt I ~t~l)I
,till :~1 ’/pl"
L161.~,1:61 (pu., t~ ~.)Im, .).)Q ).,.!If: .,.).ud l,.’~’~’))I .
Notes:
All data given in Appendix 1.
ET = Total energ5, consumption, TOE per head
ED = Finzd deliveries of energy, TOE per head
GDP = GDP by sector of origin, £ 1000’s per head, 1970
prices
PFL = Consumer price index for Fuel and Light deflated
by All Items index (excludes petrol).
PE = Price index for all energy delivered, deflated by All
Items index
t v~ues in parentheses
Durbin-Watson test: the 5 per cent significance points of
d and d are 1 100 and 1.54 respectively for two indepen-
dent variables, and 1.20 and 1.41 for one independent
variable.
Elasticities are calculated for 1977 where relevant.
The correlation coefficient for GDP and PFL is 0.34 and for
GDP and PE is 0.26.
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Appendix 4 : Tim e series regressions with geo, eric ags in the price respol se 1958-1977 (Se~ ,ot~ s at end of table)
Equations Mean /Idjusted Durbin.          Elasticities
lag     R2        Watson GDP Price     Price
(Iong-ran)(shor -ru, )
AII logs
InF;’F,tz4"93÷l.501nGDPt-0.70 ~ 0.4(l-0.4)klnPFL, t_k_l 1.50 .98 1.82
(6.20) (21.00) (4.10) k=0
In E.l.t =3.21 + 1.501nGDPt-0,32 ~ 0.49 (I -0.q9)
kin PE.t-k-I            1.02 .98       1.80
(9.63) (25.00)     (4.60) k=0
InED.I’6.93+ 1.381nGDPt--l.20 ~ 0.3q(I--0.34)kInPFL. l_k_l 1.92
.98 2.07
(8.47) (19.25) (6.66) k=0
lnED E3.57+ 1.371nGDP -0.46 ~ 0.61 (1 -0.51)
kIn Pl’:.t-k-I 0.94
.98 1.70
’ (10.79) (23.09) 6.75) k=0
Energy and GDP logged
In ET --2.40+ 1.51 InGDI’ --0.0071 o~. 0.4 (I -0.4)
k P
’ 2.68 20.84) t (4.09)k~-0 FL. t-k-I
1.50
nF:.. =2.06+ 1.511nGDP
- 0.0029
k 0
0.51 (I -0.51 k PF.t_k_1 0.94¯ 22.47 25.00) (4.55)
[nF]D g2.63+I.401nGDP-0.0122 ~ 0.34(l-0.34}kPFL. t_k_l 1.92
’ 13.33 19.15
t (6.82)
k=0
In Ei.)t g 1.89+ 1.40[nGDP -0.0043~ 0.53 (1-0.53)k PE.t-k-I 0.68
’ 20.31 22.79 (6.55) k=0
1.50 -0.70 -0.28
1.50
-0.32 --0.16
1.38 -I .20 --0.41
1.37 -0.46 --0.24
.98 1.83 1.51 -0.78 -0.31
.98 1.79 1.51 -0.41 -0.21
.98 .’2.09 1.40 -1.33 -0.46
.98 1.67 1.40
-0.60 -0.32
Contd.
Equations                                      M,:an Adjusted Durbbl-          Elasticities
R2    Wataotl (;DP Price     PHce
(Iong-runJ(~hort.run)
( DPat Iprice Io~,ed
KT.t=IO.68+2.8.11nGI)Pt-l.459 ~0.29561 0.295)khlPFl..t_k_l 2.39 .97 I..17 1.21 -0,62 0.18
(5.,t3) 616.78) (3:15) k=O
0.357 ]--0’357 ktnPE tk-I 1.80 .98 1.42 1.17 -0,28 -0.10ET. t : 7.01 + 2.76 hIGDPt
(8.53) (19.96) 63.8-I) k=O
0.286 (I 0.286)k In PFL, t-k- } 2.50.98 1.71 1.15 -I.13 -0.32E.D.    :1230+°(71nGD~l-20’)5’ ....
(8.47) 616.6.t) (6.49) k:O
ED, t=6.48+ 1.9961nGI)Pt0.752 ~ 0.424 1-0"424 klnPE t-k-I 1.36 .98 1.38 I.t] -0.42 -0.18
OI.54) (20.48) (6.43) k=0
(;DP Io,~gcd
ET, t=5..16+2.861nGDPt-O.OI5 ~ 0.29561 -O.295kl’Fi,t_k_l 2.39 .97
(11.69) (16.71) (3.46) k=O
I’~.. t = 4.61 ": 2.70 In GI)PI - 0.006
~ 0.367 ( I - 0,367)k PE, I--k-I 1.73 .98
’ 21.18 19.89 (3.77) k-=0
El).1 = 5.01 ; 2.101nGI)Pt - 0.02~ 0.295 [ --0.295 k PFl,t-k-I 2.39 .98
614.85) 616.99) (6..18) k=O
ED, I:3"Tfi+ 2.04 InGDPt -0.007 ~ 0.,133 (I -0A33 k PE,I-k-I 1.31 .98
(24.18) (20.15) 68.21) k:O
1.47
] .40
1.72
1.34
1.21 -0.69 -0.20
1.18 -0.36 --0.13
1.17 --I.22 -0.36
1.13 --0,54 --0.33
Contd.
Eqttalt’ons Mean ..Idjltstcd Durbin-           Elasll’c¢’th’s
lag     1@2       Watson GDP Pn’c,"     Pffce
(Iong-rzm ) (short.mn )
Ener~, logged
InET. I-- 1.60+2.6001)Pt--0.0228 ~O. II(I-0.11)kPEL. t_k_l 81. .98 1.52 1.5 -2.50 -0.97
(3A7} (7.63)     (4.50) k=0
In ET.t =-0"56+3"28GDPt -0.0036 ~0.514 (I -0.514)
k l’E.t_k_l 0.9 .98 1.74 1.89 -0.50 -0.26
(7.8.t) (2.t.4) (5.43) k=O
InED. t=0.496+2.88GI)Pt-0.015~ 0..986(I -0.286)kPFL. t_k_l 2.:3 .98 1.84 1.66 -I.67 -0.48
(2.73) (16.97) (7.32) k=O
In ED. t = -0.57.1 + 3.07 GI)Pt - 0.0047 ~0.586 (I - 0.586)k l’E. t-k-I 0.7 .98 1.69 .I.77 -0.7 -0.39(8.27) (-93.10) (7.55) k=O
.Vo le~;:
~’$llrrlation. The EAS (1975) computer program package used here uses the tllaxlmttnl likdiht~od se;irch procedure in estimating:
t-t -1
EI=:l+~t(l -a)t-to+hGl)I’t + c %- ~(I -(3’)
k Pt-k-I +et
k=O
"i~rhere’~ is a parameter corresponding to the Irltneatlon remainder; tile second lerffl ovt:r¢llnles the problem th:~t Ihere is ilol an
infinite number of observations.
Elasticities are cJculatcd for 1977 where relevant.
Data as ill Appendix I
Appendix 5: Projections to 1990. Energy demand in MTOE
1977-1990 GDP growth %
1977-J990 growth in real price of energy%
Ordhtary time series
Cases
1 I1 111 I Iz
70 70    70 100
0 20 50 20
Time series with lagged price
Cases
I II I11 I V
70 70 70 100
0 20 50 20
Functional Form
All logs
Total energy, ET (using PFL)
Total energy, ET (using PE)
Final deliveries, ED(usin8 PFL)
Final deliveries, ED (using PE)
Energy & GDP logged
Total energy, ET (using PFL)
Total energy, ET (using PE)
Final deliveries, ED (using PFL)
Final deliveries, ED (using PE)
GDP & price logged
Total energy, ET(using PFL)
Total energy, ET (using PE)
Final defiveries, ED (using PFL)
Final deliveries, ED (using PE)
15.58 14.76 13.82
15.21 14.77 14.24
11.54 10.47 9.29
11.06 10.49 9.82
15.60 14.62 13.27
15.21 14.57 13.64
11.58 10.30 8.64
11.07 10.25 9.13
12.08 11.96 11.81
12.00 11.92 11.82
9.24 8.86 8.38
9.06 8.84 8.57
18.42 15.44 13.93 12.28 17.65
18.59 15.10 14.38 13.54 18.16
12.91 10.70 9.02 7.33 11.2l
12.88 10.73 9.99 9.15 12.39
18.26 15.52 13.71 11.45 17.39
18.17 15.17 14.16 12.81 17.94
12.71 10.78 8.79 6.55 10.95
12.62 10.82 9.78 8.44 12.18
13.29 12.40 11.69 10.81 13.30
13.25 12.15 11.81 11.39 13.38
9.87 9.04 8.06 6.86 9.24
9.84 9.00 8.59 8.09 9.73
-- Continued Appendix 5: Projections to 1990. Energy demand in MTOE
1977-1990 GDP growth %
1977-1990growth in real price of energy %
Ordinary time series            Time series with logged price
Cases                                Cases
1 11 I11 I V 1 I1 III I V
70 70 70 100 70 70 70 100
0 20 50 20 0 20 50 20
GDP logged
Total energy, ET (using PFL)
Total energy, ET (using PE)
Final deliveries, ED (using PFL)
Final dchvcrics, ED (using PE)
Linear
Total energy, ET (using PFL)
Total energy, ET (using PE)
Final dcllvcrics, ED(USing PFL)
Final deliveries, ED (using PE)
unacceptable Durbin-Watson 12.43 11.57 10.34 13.21
(as also in the form: GDP and 12.18 11.70 11,00 13.29
price logged, above) 9,12 7.96 6.29 9.15
9.03 8.46 7.62 9.62
14.52 13.95 13.52 17.05 14,29 13.17 11,56 16.37
14.35 14.06 13.62 16.99 14.35 13.80 13.00 16.97
11.11 10.45 9.46 12,68 10.52 9.21 7.31 11.54
10,84 10.40 9.72 12.61 10.76 10.14 9,24 12.50
Notes: ET = total energy consumption, TOE per head
ED = f’mal deliveries of energy, TOE per head
PFL = Fuel and Light price index deflated by All Items index
PE = general energy price index deflated by All Items index
Appendix 6
ESTIMA 77ON METHOD USED FOR TltE MODEL W1771
GEOMETRIC LAGS
Klein suggested a direct estimation method for this moclel.
Maddala (1977) (p. 360) summariscs it as follows: Wc have a
model with a geometric or Koyck lag structure on the in-
dependent variable (price):
1. Yt = 13(1-k) Zkaxt_i + ut
i-0
It assumes that the response to price decays geometric~dly
i.e., by factors )t, X2, X3 etc (0<’h<l). This assumes that
after a price rise, for example, people might first replace
their most inefficient or large energy using appliances (or
habits) and make successively lesser adjustments gradually.
The model can be broken down:
t--1 ,                             I~O
2. Yt =/3(1--;k) Z )tlxt_i +/3(l--X) 2; ;ki xt_i + ut
i=0             i=t
The first term can be computed from the actual observations
for an), given value of X, the second term cannot because we
do not have observations for x0, x l, x 2, et cetera. But
writing i--t=j (or i=t+j) the second term becomes
oo                           oo
/3(1--2,) )2 ),t+Jx_j=xt/3(1--X) 2; xJ x_j=xtr/o=Xt E(Yo)
j=0              j=0
by reference to 1. So r/o is a parameter corresponding to the
truncation remainder, and can be called an "initial vzdue
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parameter". The model can be written:
3. Yt =/3Zlt + ri0 z2t + ut
t--1.
where Zlt=(l-x) E Xlxt_i
i=0
,and
z2t = ~t
The procedure for estimating ~ ,and 13 are as follows: For
each value of ~ we construct the variables Zlt and z2t then
regress Yt on Zlt and z2t and look at the residual sum of
squares. We choose that value of X for which this is a min-
imum. This is the maximum likelihood estimate of ~, and the
corresponding values of/3 and rlo are the ML estimates.of the
parameters. It can be shown that the estimators for /3 and
X are consistent but that for rlo is not. The inapplicability of
the Durbin-Watson statistic as a test for autocorrelation in
certain distributed log models is well known. However,
because Klein’s method gives consistent estimates of 13 and
~, the Durbin-Watson statistic is applicable (Dhrymes 1971
p. 344).
The EAS (Econometric Analysis System) package uses this
method, denoting X by (l--u) and delaying the initial
response to a price rise by one year.
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Appendix 7
0 TILER PRICE EL/I S 77C177ES 017 DEMAND FOR
ENER G Y
Given here are a few other calculations of effects of price
changes on the demand for energy. First the evidence for
Ireland is summarised, then a few interesting international
studies are mentioned.
Price elasticities of demand in Ireland
Y~ar
in which
the
elasticity Price
applies elasticity Source
Fue{
Petrol
Fuel
Petrol
Petrol
Petrol
Petrol
1974 --0.,57 McCarthy
(1977)
1974 --0.84 McCarthy
(1977)
1972 -- .59 O’Riordan
(1976)
1972 --1.0 O’Riordan
(1972)
1968 --0.40 (long term) Feeney
(1979)
1968 --0.03 (quarterly, short term) Feeney
(1976)
1968 --0.155 (annual, short term) Feeney
(1976)
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Price elasticities from a cross-nation study of sixteen nations
Fuel and power 1970 --0.55 (0.24) Kravis (1978b)
Fuel and power 1973 --0.75 (O.18) Kravis (1978b)
Electrlcit~, 1970 --0.74 (0.29) Kravis (1978b)
Liquid fuels 1970 --0.82 (0.61) Kravis (1978b)
Other fuels and ice 1970 -0.73 (0.47) Kravis (1978b)
The countries comprise: Belgium, Colombia, France, Germany, Hungary,
India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands,
Philippines, the UK and the USA. Standard errors in parentheses.
For a comprehensive list of studies undertaken before 1977 of price
elasticities for energy, see: Report of the Working Group on Energy
Elasticities, Energy Paper Number 17. Dept. of Energy, HMSO, Feb.
1977.
Elasticities in the table below for the US, reproduced from
Hudson mad Jorgenson (1978) indicate the changes in the
relative quantities in which two inputs are used, caused by a
change in their relative prices. The authors state:
The numerical values of these elasticities can be inter-
preted as follows: a value of zero means that the two in-
puts are used in fixed proportions; a negative value means
that tbere is a complementary relationship between the
inputs, a rise in the price of one innut is associated witb
reduced use of the second input; a positive value implies
a snbstitution relationship, a rise in the price of one input
leads to increased use of the other. Also, the greater the
absolute value of the elasticity, the stronger the relation-
ship or interaction between the inputs. The own elasticity
of substitution will be negative; this simply implies that
when the price of this input rises, demand for the input
will decline.
In agriculture, non-fuel mining, and construction there is a
reasonably strong substitution relationship between energy
and labor, and a substantial response of energy demand to
energy price. In manufacturing, there are three strong
interactions; energy and labor, and capital and labor are
substitutes while energy and capital are complements. The
commercial transportation sector exhibits complementarity
between energy and capital and a significant own price
elasticity of demand for energy. In the services, trade, and
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Allen partial elasticities of substitution between inputs in the US
INPUT
Capital Labour Energy Intermediate
materials
Agriculture, non-fuel mining construction
Capital --1.7673
Labour 0.3553 --2.5018
Energy --0.0591 1.4148 --29.6499
Intermediate materials 0.6134 1.0442 0.5987 --0.8289
Manufacturing
Capital --3.1820
Labour 1.1004 -1.6181
Energy --1.4156 1.8900 -- 4.8410
Intermediate material 0.0963 0.5072 -- 0.4732 --0.2435
Commercial transport
Capital -- 1.4036
Labour 0.1755 --1.0920
Energy --0.8577 --0.0574 --11.5998
Intermediate materials 0.5747 1.1309 1.7739 --1.7267
Services, trade, communications
Capital 1.6979
Labour 1.0903 --0.8795
Energy 1.2110 2.3065 --49.3616
Intermediate material 0.0660 0.0440 -- 1.8201 --0.0245
communications sector, there are four strong interdepen-
dencies: energy and capital, energy anad labor, and capital
and labor are substitutes while energy and intermediate
materials are complements.
No such study has been undertaken for Ireland. We only
know that there was a negative correlation between energy
,and nnmbers employed per unit of output in 8 of 10 major
sectors, from 1962-1973.
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Appendix 8
Comparison of costs of various fuels in different hea ring systems for domestic heating
in Dublin, 5th February, 1980.
Price per unit of useful heat (p/kwh)
Applmnce
Open fire Enclosed Central Warm Electric Direct
Plain With high stoveI heating air storage electric
output boiler systems heaters heaters
back boiler
Flueless
heater
Coal 3.8 2.5 1.4 1.4
Turf 2.4 1.6 0.9 0.9
Briquettes 3.3 2.2 1.2 1.2
Anthracite 1.8 1.8 1.7
Towngas 3.4 3.7
Gas oil 2.0 2.1
Kerosene 2.1 2.3
Butane Propane 2.7
Electricity 3.1 3.1
2.5
2.5
4.2
Note: 1 -- or room heater with back boiler
Source: C. Ward, Institute for Industrial Research and Standards. These costs apply for a semi-detached house of
100m2 floor area. For other assumptions, apply to C. Ward.
Appendix 9
PRESS RELEASE FROM TIlE DEPARTZvIENT OF
INDUSTR Y, COMMERCE AND ENERGY
Report of Inter-Departmental Committee on Allocation
of Kinsale Head Gas
Following proposals from the Dublin Gas Company in
July 1977 for an allocation from the Kinsale Head natural
gas find for distribution by that Company in the Dublin
area the Minister for Industry, Commerce and Energy ap-
pointed an Inter-Departmental Committee consisting of
representatives of his Department, the Department of Fin-
ance and the Department of Economic Planning and Devel-
opment to consider the allocation for energy purposes of a
major part of the Kinsale Head gas and to consider specifi-
cally thc proposes of the Dublin Gas Company for an allo-
cation of this gas.
The Inter-Departmental Committee have concluded their
study of this matter and their report has been submitted to
the Minister for Industry, Comlnercc and Energy. The main
conclusions to the Report which the Minister, after careful
consideration and consultation witb bis Government col-
leagues, accepts are:--
(i) natural gas should in general be allocated on the basis of
commercial procedures and principles and other things
being equal, on the basis of market prices. Considera-
tions of national interest may, however, occasionally
warrant a price less than the optimal commercial price.
(ii) The use of natural gas for base load electricity genera-
tion may not be the best use for natural gas and alter-
native uses should therefore be actively sought. How-
ever, subject to provision for interruptability, the
natural gas for base load electricity generation is likely
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to continue for some considerable time. On the other
hand, the use of natural gas for "peak shaving" elec-
tricity generation would be generally regarded as a
prime use for the gas.
(iii) any alternative uses for the gas should be ewduated and
compared in the first instance in the light of the gas
price a project could bear, the minimum price being the
cost to the ESB of replacing the gas and of any trans-
portation costs.
(iv) The use of Kinsale gas by the Dublin Gas Company on
the basis of the foregoing criteria would not be a reason-
able financial proposition, and
(v) the pricing arrangements with the ESB in relation to its
allocation of natural gas should be reviewed as soon as
possible with a view to determining what would be an
appropriate energy related price. The consideration of
the price to be charged to the Cork Gas Company
should also take into account its energy related value.
The Minister has directed that the future policy of Bord
Gais Eireann should be in accordance with the foregoing
principles. In particular, he has asked Bord Gais Eireann and
the Industrial Development Authority to investigate the
possibilities of obtaining alternative uses for the ESB’s alloca-
tion of natural gas including industrial development and em-
ployment creation through new industries for which the
availability of natural gas would be an important considera-
tion.
The Minister also announces that due to his concern about
the future of the town gas industry he proposes to arrange
for a review of its operations.
10 April 1978.
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